Wednesday
/ December 8, 1999
Central Asia - Caucasus
Institute ©
Johns Hopkins University's
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Pierre-Arnaud
Chouvy
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Carte
administrative de l'Afghanistan
(format .pdf : 60 ko)
***
The
Taliban government sees its long awaited international recognition
more than ever compromised by the dramatic increase in Afghanistan’s
opium production that has literally exploded in 1999. The rise
of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan since 1994 has coincided
with this increased production. Afghanistan's standing as the
world's leading opium producer will only worsen the situation
of the Taliban government on the international and even national
scenes.
BACKGROUND:
In 1999, despite earlier gestures that it would take eradication
measures, Afghanistan's opium production doubled. A similar
doubling of the opium crop in 1986-1987 from 350 to 850 tons,
repeated itself this year but in quite higher proportions. This
year the 90,983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of 4,581
tons of dry opium, that is somewhere between 70% to 117% more
than 1998. There is no question of the responsibility of the
Taliban government for the recent increase in opium under cultivation
since 97% of these areas are under Taliban control.
Even
though the Amir-ul-Momineen himself, Mullah Omar, emphasized
on several occasions his will to fight against opiate production,
the Taliban levying of Islamic taxes, zakat and ushr,
on opium production and trade glaringly shows this Islamic government's
role in justifying an activity contrary to the very principles
of Islam. The Taliban policies proceed from a dilemma related
to a combination of several internal and external factors. On
the internal level, Afghanistan's socio-economic situation makes
opium production one of the only available economic means that
provides access to land, labor and credit. Currently, the Afghan
peasantry’s heavy dependence upon opium production, associated
with politico-territorial realities of a tribal society with
fragile political allegiances, is prohibiting the Taliban from
making any attempts at eradication.
"It
is simply not possible to eradicate the poppy without alienating
the farmers," explained Abdul Rashid, director of drug control
for Kandahar province in 1997. Reports that the Taliban were
going to proceed this year in eradicating some 400 hectares
in the southernmost province of Kandahar, the province where
they have their greatest support, testifies to their fear of
addressing the problem elsewhere where their support is less
secure.
IMPLICATIONS:
Taliban's involvement in opium production will be badly
felt by Afghanistan's neighbors who fear the spilling over of
both Afghanistan’s fundamentalism and drug culture. On the external
level, the production increase will undoubtedly expose more
of Afghanistan's neighbors to problems associated with heroin
use such as addiction, crime, and HIV infection. India, the
Central Asian states and Iran should all experience heavier
flows of opiates through their territories. Central Asia is
now estimated to channel more than 65% of Afghan opiates. Iran
remains widely used by traffickers a situation made clear by
the November killings of 35 anti-narcotics agents by drug smugglers.
The opium traffic has already taken a heavy toll on Pakistani
and Iranian populations each having about 1.5 to 2 million drug
addicts. The recent production increase will certainly worsen
the developing drug addiction problem in Central Asia.
As
for the November 14 United Nations sanctions on Afghanistan,
they do not bode well for any diminution of opium production,
especially since Afghanistan’s wheat crop this year was down
16%. With the dramatic poppy cultivation increase, that already
limits the land allocated to food crops, and the furthering
of economic sanctions, more farmers will undoubtedly be tempted
to switch to opium production. Indeed, beyond agricultural and
economic considerations, marketing through smuggling networks
makes opium production even more attractive. This is already
clear. In 1999, poppy cultivation was extended to 27 new districts
in Afghanistan.
CONCLUSIONS:
As for the implementation of any eradication policy, the international
non-recognition of the Taliban government is of primary importance.
The methods of action against opium production in Afghanistan
are largely compromised as long as the country does not have
international recognition. Even the United Nations Drug Control
Programme cannot legally conduct any formal agreement with the
Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally
recognized. Indeed, Mullah Omar offered again in
1998 to eradicate poppy cultivation in exchange for the recognition
by the United Nations of its government as the legitimate one
of Afghanistan. His offer could be taken seriously by the international
community that opposes Taliban’s policies and actions.
To
engage in poppy eradication, Afghanistan must have international
recognition and aid that are in turn impeded by Taliban political
policies and actions deemed unacceptable by the international
community. But the dilemma for the Taliban, who need both regional
and international assistance, is that they cannot reasonably
give up their mass support by forcing the peasantry of this
predominantly agricultural country to engage in opium eradication,
one of the only means of economic survival. The internal support
of the population for opium cultivation or eradication is directly
dependent on the contributions of the international assistance.
Alone and without support, whether internal or external, the
Taliban government cannot afford to engage in the eradication
of opium, the country's main cash crop.
AUTHOR
BIO: Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy is currently working on a Doctorate
in Geography at the Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris, France.
His work deals with a geopolitical approach of the emerging
conditions of both the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle.
NOSPAMpachouvy@geopium.org (Be
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Copyright 1999 The ANALYST ©
All rights reserved.
---
Les
territoires de l'opium. Conflits et trafics du Triangle d'Or
et du Croissant d'Or
de Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
Genève, Olizane, 2002.
Consulter
la table des matières et lire l'introduction.
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
Geopium
1998 - 2003 ©
