Drugs and the Financing of Terrorism
By Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
The financing of terrorism through illicit drug trafficking has
been touted as a major problem since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. Indeed, during the last decade, Afghanistan has been the
most important opium producing country in the world. It was under
Taliban rule in 1999 that opium production reached its height with
a 4,581-ton yield. Moreover, the fact that al-Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden found a safe haven in that country, raised concerns about
the possible emergence of a more global and pernicious alliance
between drug traffickers and terrorists. But three years after the
ouster of the Taliban, Afghanistan's opium production is expected
to exceed even 1999's record high, thus raising concerns that the
country is on the verge of becoming a "narco-state" and
a bastion of "narco-terrorism." Antonio Maria Costa, the
Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
warned of "mounting evidence of drug money being used to finance
criminal activities, including terrorism," and declared that
"fighting drug trafficking equals fighting terrorism."
The fact that the very term "narco-terrorism" appears
to be too vague and counterproductive in terms of addressing either
drug trafficking or terrorism - since it brings very different actors
into too broad a category - has not kept most observers and politicians
from resorting extensively to such a notion. Still, it is worthwhile
examining the extent to which terrorism is funded by the illicit
drug economy, if only to highlight the minimal role this plays in
al-Qaeda's finances.
A few cases have been highlighted by the media as evidence of al-Qaeda
tapping into the opium economy of Afghanistan, even though the claims
in themselves do not constitute an argument for the existence of
any organized form of "narco-terrorism." Doubtless, terrorist
outfits are not less likely than others to at least try to benefit
from such a resource, especially in a country like Afghanistan where
the opium economy is estimated to equal half of the country's legitimate
gross domestic product. However, for the term not to become hackneyed,
it seems that "narco-terrorism" should not refer to terrorist
groups that have been only partly funded by illegal drugs, but rather
to identify organized narcotics traffickers who seek to affect the
policies of a government by terrorist means. Moreover, when one
considers the direct and/or indirect involvement of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
in the drug trade, it further complicates the adequacy of a category
such as "narco-terrorism" and would require comparing
how different actors like resistance guerrillas, intelligence and
counter-insurgency agencies, and terrorist organizations use the
drug economy.
In post-Taliban Afghanistan and prior to 2004, the U.S. has condoned
opiates production both in areas traditionally controlled by the
United Front (Badakhshan) and in areas held by various local commanders
whose support was deemed strategically necessary to fight the Taliban
and al-Qaeda. Since then, some media reports have alleged continuing
links between terrorists and illicit drug traffickers and have claimed
that organizations involved in or benefiting from drug trafficking
include al-Qaeda, Taliban remnants and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami.
[4] According to Western intelligence agencies, "recent busts
have revealed evidence of al-Qaeda's ties to the trade." Such
ties were inferred by various seizures of narcotics such as the
one made by the U.S. Navy in the Arabian Sea on a small fishing
boat aboard which "several al-Qaeda guys sitting on a bale
of drugs" were found. In another case, the Kabul house of a
drug trafficker was raided and a dozen satellite phones, used to
call numbers "linked to suspected terrorists" in Turkey,
the Balkans and Western Europe, were found. Hitherto, arguably the
most serious case involving a connection between drug traffickers
and "terrorists" is that revolving around the network
of Haji Juma Khan, an Afghan national. According to some reports,
western intelligence agencies are said to believe that Khan is the
head of a heroin-trafficking organization that is a "principal
source of funding for the Taliban and al-Qaida terrorists."
Khan's boats would allegedly ship Afghan heroin out of the Pakistani
port of Karachi and would return from the Middle East loaded with
arms for both al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Mirwais Yasini, the head of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Directorate,
who estimates that the Taliban and its allies derived more than
$150 million from drugs in 2003, also alleges that there are "central
linkages" between Khan, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Conversely,
the independent commission investigating the September 11th attacks
recently declared that "the US government still has not determined
with any precision how much al Qaeda raises or from whom, or how
it spends its money." According to this report, al-Qaeda is
mainly funded by rich individuals from the Persian Gulf and by some
Islamic charities. Of greater interest, still, is the commission's
assertion that there is "no substantial evidence that al Qaeda
played a major role in the drug trade or relied on it as an important
source of revenue either before or after 9/11." [2]
However, if al-Qaeda is connected to the opium economy of Afghanistan,
it would not be at the production level but higher up in the chain
of drug processing and trafficking, most likely involving the protection
of heroin laboratories and trafficking caravans. As for where the
money generated from drug production and trafficking goes, it has
always been divided iniquitously, in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
among farmers who receive the smallest share; producers/warlords
who condone or encourage production in their territory, and local
and regional traffickers who get the biggest share. Moreover, al-Qaeda
is likely to have become involved in the drug trade after the ouster
of the Taliban who were after all levying taxes on the opium trade.
It is also important to stress that it was the Taliban who benefited
from al-Qaeda's funding and not the other way round. Indeed, as
stated by the 9/11 commission, "prior to 9/11 the largest single
al Qaeda expense was support for the Taliban, estimated at about
$20 million per year." Moreover, knowledgeable observers agree
that the drug trade was at that time the Taliban's second source
of revenue, estimated at $80 or $100 million in 1999. This reliable
estimate casts serious doubt on allegations that the Taliban earned
more from drugs in 2003 than in 1999 when opium production was higher
and when they controlled 85% of Afghanistan. Besides, the 9/11 commission
declared that "intelligence collection efforts have failed
to corroborate rumours of current narcotic trafficking. In fact,
there is compelling evidence the al Qaeda leadership does not like
or trust those who today control the drug trade in Southwest Asia,
and has encouraged its members not to get involved."
In the absence of evidence pointing to "narco-terrorism"
in Afghanistan or elsewhere, reports alleging its existence seem
to originate from "political intelligence" for which "truth
is not the goal" of intelligence gathering - it is "victory."
[3] Hence, it may be that recent efforts to link the narcotics economy
to terrorism really aims at linking the war on drugs to the war
on terrorism, and vice-versa. While drugs and terrorism are not
necessarily the two faces of the same coin in Afghanistan, the war
on drugs and the war on terrorism may serve the same political agenda.
A clear example is the current efforts of the U.S. Southern Command
to guarantee the prolongation of its enhanced funding by raising
the threat of "narco-terrorism" in Latin America, where
"U.S. military aid and training, which previously were focused
on counter-narcotics operations, have now been re-tasked as counter-terrorism
responsibilities." [4]
The argument that the threat of narco-terrorism - whatever its
definition - in Afghanistan and elsewhere is hyped by political
and sectional interests rather than originating from hard intelligence
is clearly not without foundation. Moreover while there is little
doubt that some proceeds of the illicit drug trade contribute partially
to the funding of some terrorist outfits, drug trafficking is still
far from being the main financing source of global terrorism. Indeed,
it is clear that terrorists and drug traffickers have differing
long-term goals which should be considered in the methods used to
counter both. Thus, fighting drug trafficking does not necessarily
equate to fighting terrorism, even though "narco-terrorism,"
depicted as a threat by certain sectional interests, arguably legitimates
and reinforces a failed global war on drugs.
Dr Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy is a research fellow at CNRS, France. He
studies the geopolitics of illicit drugs in Asia.
Notes:
1. The most comprehensive report is: Tim McGirk's, Terrorism Harvest,
Time Asia Magazine, Volume 164, N° 6, August 9, 2004.
2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch1.pdf.
3. Tom Barry, The neo-con philosophy of intelligence, Asia Times,
19 February 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FB19Aa01.html.
4. Eleanor Thomas and Lindsay Thomas, U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom)
Struggles to Justify its Role in the War on Terror, Council on Hemispheric
Affairs, 2 September 2004, http://www.coha.org.
